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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant has failed to state appropriate jurisdictional
grounds for the jurisdiction of this appeal. Appellant sets
forth Rule 3 and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
which are procedural provisions and do not state why this Court
has jurisdiction.
Further, Appellant sets forth Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a3(2)(e) which states that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
of cases involving criminal appeals.

This is not a criminal

case.
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
As required by Rule 24(b)(1), Appellee has not included a
statement of issues presented for review, determinative law or a
statement of the case (a) Nature of the Case (b) Course of
Proceedings/Disposition of the Trial Court.

However, Appellee

does wish to supplement the Appellant's statement of facts with
the following facts.

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
These facts are intended to supplement the facts as set
forth in Appellant's brief.
1.

The parties were married on February 21, 1998 [R.82 at

2.

Petitioner/Appellee (hereinafter "Stephanie") did not

26].

work from the time of marriage in 1998 until October, 2001. [R.82
at 31].
3.

Respondent/Appellant (hereinafter "Jason") became a

manager of a Portland, Oregon, Walmart store in 2001. [R.82 at
22].
4.

Jason's base pay as a manager was $50,000.00 plus a

percentage of the store's profits.

In that year he made

$65,000.00. [R.82 at 29].
5.

The income of the family in 2001 was $65,677.00.

In

2002, it was $52,601.00. [R.83 at 36].
6.

In Jason's Answer and Counterclaim he stated his income

to be $40,680.00 per year, or $3390.37 per month. [R.82 at 36].
7.

In Jason's financial declaration, he indicated his

income was $2600.00 per month, or $31,200.00 per year. [R.82 at
36].

2

8«

Jason's current income was determined from a check stub

present at trial showing he received $1287.00 every two weeks,
$30,888.00 per year.

Jason had also stated that his income was

$13.90 per hour, for $2390.00 per month or $28,689.00 per year.
[R. 82 at 36].
9.

Stephanie's income included $555.00 in welfare and

$336o00 in food stamps. [R.82 at 43, 225].
10.

Stephanie set forth two financial declaration, one of

which was intended to show the change which would occur if child
support and alimony were paid. [R.82 at 43-45; Exhibits 1 and 2].
11.

Stephanie's family has subsidized her living expenses.

[R.82 at 54].
12.

When attempting work in the San Juan County area and

putting the children in day care, Stephanie was earning $7.00 per
hour and paying $6.00 per hour for day care. [R.82 at 62].
13o

Stephanie is working towards a nursing degree. [R.82 at

14.

When the parties moved from Oregon to Illinois, they

63].

anticipated that Jason would work as an assistant manager and
believed that his income would remain the same as when he was a
manager in Oregon. [R.82 at 87].
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15.

The parties had substantial credit card debt. [R.82 at

37-42; Exhibit 5].
16.

Stephanie had no ability to pay the credit card

obligations. [R.82 at 42, 54].
17.

Stephanie had no ability to pay attorney's fees. [R.82

at 50].
18.

Jason chose not to work as a manager. [R.82 at 55].

19.

Jason's decision to cut back on his hours did not come

until one year after he was separated from Stephanie. [R.82 at
145].
20.

At the time Jason chose not to be an assistant manager

in December, 2002, he was making $41,500.00 per year. [R82 at
176].
21.

During the marriage Jason had worked as a manager, a

co-manager, an assistant manager, once again as a manager and
then as an assistant manager. [R.82 at 148].
22.

Jason's stated reason for not working as a manager is

"I want to make sure my life is in order first". [R.82 at 147].
23.

At the time of the trial Jason was living with a woman

who had two children. [R.82 at 144].
24.

At the time of the trial Jason was reporting that he

had three children in his current home. [R.82 at 154].

4

25.

At the time of the trial Jason was supporting a

girlfriend, her two children and a child born to Jason and the
woman. [R.82 at 155].
26.

Jason shares household expenses with his current

girlfriend, their common child and her two other children. [R.82
at 169].
27.

Jason had not checked to see if he could move or work

closer to his children in Utah. [R.82 at 175].
28.

At the time Jason told Stephanie he wanted a divorce,

they were living with Jason's parents. [R.82 at 74].
29.

Jason suggested that Stephanie go to Utah. [R.82 at

30.

Jason offered to move Stephanie. [R.82 at 176].

175].

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the trial court's determination of alimony
and attorney fees, an appellate courts reviews that decision for
an abuse of discretion.
1997) quoting Salmon

Wiley

v. Davis

v. Wiley,
County,

951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah

916 P.2D 890, 892, 898

(Utah 1996) (stating that determination of reasonable attorney
fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court because of its
familiarity with litigation, attorneys and attorney fees in
general); Paffel

v. Paffel,

732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)(stating

5

that a trial court's awarding of alimony is not disturbed unless
there is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion); Owen v.
Owen, 579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978)(stating that considerable
discretion is afforded the trial court "due to the advantaged
position and responsibility of the trial court in such matters").
Generally speaking, questions of law are reviewed for
correctness.

The trial court's factual findings are reviewed

only if clearly erroneous.

State

v. Finlayson,

994 P.2d 1243,116

(Utah 2000).
Factual determinations are entitled to deference on appeal
and not reversible absent clear error.

Lysenko

v. Sawayaf

7 P.3d

783 515.
An Appellate Court "will not reverse the findings of Fact of
a trial court sitting without a jury unless they are 'against the
clear weight of the evidence', thus making them clearly
erroneous.

(Dept.

of Human Services

945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997).

ex rel

Parker

In the Shepherd

case

v.

Irizarry,
the court

stated:
". . . The trial court has considerable latitude in
adjusting financial and property interests, and its
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity".
Naranjo v. Naranjo,
751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Ut.Ct.App.
1988); Shepherd v. Shepherd,
876 P.2d 429, 430 (Ut.Ct.
App.1994).
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"This Court will not disturb the trial court's decision
[concerning property division] unless it is clearly
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion". Shepherd
Id.
at 433.

And in the case of Elman v. Elman,

443 Utah Adv. Rpt.40,117,

45 P.3d 176, 117, the court noted:
"117'A trial court has considerable discretion
concerning property [division] in a divorce proceeding
thus its actions enjoy a presumption of validity.'
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg,
875 P.2d 598, 602 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1994). We disturb a trial court's property
division and valuation 'only when there is 'a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting
in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion''. Id. (quoting Noble v.
Noble,
761 P.2d 1269, 1373 (Utah 1988))."

ARGUMENT
I
APPELLANT (JASON) HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE
THEN ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN IMPUTING INCOME, AWARDING ALIMONY AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND ORDERING JASON TO PAY THE COSTS
INVOLVED IN EXERCISING PARENT TIME.

A party who seeks to overturn the factual decisions of a
court has the responsibility of marshaling the evidence.
court stated in Utah Med. Prods,

v. Searcy,

(Utah 1998) :

7

The

958 P.2d 228,232

"After marshaling all of the evidence in support of the
trial court's ruling, the appellant must demonstrate
that even in the light most favorable to the trial
court, the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings. Reed v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Company,
176 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1980). We apply this
deferential standard to trial courts because of their
advantaged position to evaluate the evidence and
determine the facts. Willey
v. Willey,
951 P.2d 226,
Civil
230 (Utah 1997); see also Utah Rules of
Rule 52a. If the challenger fails to meet
Proceduref
this burden its claim must fail."

In setting forth the standard of review in the case of
v. Robertson,

State

932 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Utah 1997), the court stated:

"Before this court Robertson essentially challenges the
trial court's finding of fact. Therefore Robertson
bears the burden of marshaling all of the evidence in
favor of the factual findings that he was malingering
then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence
is insufficient to support the court's finding."
Additionally, in the case of Whitear

v. Labor

Commission,

973 P.2d 982, 985 (Ut.Ct. App. 1998), the court stated:
"When a party fails to marshal the evidence, we assume
the record supports the commission's findings. See
Intermountain
Health Care v. Industrial
Commfnf 839
P.2d 841, 844 (Ut.Ct.App. 1992). We have shown no
reluctance to affirm when the petitioner has failed to
meet its marshaling burden. See e.g. Turnbaugh
v.
Anderson,
793 P.2d 939, 944 (Ut.Ct.App. 1990).
Jason supports his position by reference to the record on
those issues most favorable to him, but has failed to set forth
all of the facts and especially those most favorable to the

8

court's findings below and then show why the court could not find
as it did*

Failing to marshal the evidence and demonstrate to

this court why the findings are insufficient when viewed most
favorable to the court's findings, his claims must fail.
II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
IMPOSED THE STATUTORY GUIDELINES FOR PARENT TIME AND
REQUIRED JASON TO PAY THE COSTS OF GETTING THE CHILDREN TO
AND FROM PARENT TIME VISITS.
In the case of Hudemy v. Carpenter,

989 P.2d 491, the court

was faced with a determination of what was in a child's best
interest where it was requested to change custody.

While a

change of custody was not requested in our casef the best
interests of the children was an issue.
At Utah Code Annotated §30-3-34, the court is charged with
the responsibility of "establishing a parent time schedule
consistent with the best interests of the child".

In Hudemy at

f26 in addressing the best interest issue, the court said:
"Generally it is within the trial court's discretion to
determine based on the facts before it and within the
confines set by the appellate courts, where a
particular factor falls within the spectrum of relative
importance and to import each factor its appropriate
weight." See Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah
1988); Childs v. Childs,
967 P.2d 942, 945 (Ut.Ct.App.
1998, Cert. Denied) 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999 Lexis
64(1999)(the importance of the myriad of factors used
in determining the child's best interest ranges from
the possibly relevant to the critically important).
9

The court took into consideration the extensive distance
between the parties where it indicated they were separated by
1200-1300 miles. [R.82 at 218]. The court further reasoned that
it was going to be nearly impossible for Jason to see the
children for any length of time except on long vacations. [R.82
at 217]. The court then made a concession with regard to the
four year old by setting the minimum visitation schedule for five
through 18 year olds, taking into consideration that the two
children would likely be more comfortable going together. [R.82
at 218].
The court further found that there had not been any
testimony or evidence that an alternative custody arrangement
would be beneficial to the children or was in fact set forth or
requested. [R.82 at 217]. The court had information that when
Jason told Stephanie he did not want to be married to her anymore
that he suggested she go to Utah [R.82 at 175] and that he
offered to move her [R.82 at 176]. The court noted that Jason
chose to stay in the Chicago area because his girlfriend had
close ties there. [R.82 at 175].
The court had information that Jason did not seek marital
help when the marriage was having difficulty. [R.82 at 154].
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Jason had not checked to see if he could work closer to his Utah
children [R.82 at 175].
The court considered Stephanie's ability to help pay for the
cost of parent time and found her income of approximately $900
per month [R.82 at 43] where the court found she did not have an
ability to pay the credit cards and other debts. [R.82 at 37,
42], did not have an ability to pay attorney' fees [R.82 at 50]
and drove a car with over 150,000 miles [R.82 at 89] in which she
did not feel comfortable driving halfway because of the car's
lack of dependability. [R.82 at 84].
In making a determination regarding parent time expense, the
distance that the parties must travel is only one factor.

The

court took into consideration the relative ability of each of the
parties to pay the costs.

Utah Code Annotated £30-3-34,

indicates that the court may make adjustments.

The statute also

sets forth the provision that the parent time schedule in Utah
Code Annotated §30-3-35, which the court applied in this case, is
". . . presumed to be in the best interest of the child
. . . unless a parent can establish otherwise by a
preponderance of the evidence that more or less parent
time should be awarded. . . "
Jason has simply quoted the statute and indicated that
because one of the criteria is the distance between the parties
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that some adjustment should be made over the presumed reasonable
schedule.

Jason has not, by a preponderance of the evidence,

shown that the court should have done something different in this
circumstance and the court had many facts to consider with regard
to the best interest of the children.

The court did not abuse

its discretion in setting parent time in accordance with the
statutory schedule and had substantial evidence to find and rule
as it did.
With regard to the court's determination that Jason should
be responsible for his parent time costs, it is clear that the
court took into consideration the relative financial
circumstances of each of the parties.
The Court also took into consideration that Jason had
initiated the breakup of the marriage and had suggested that
Stephanie move to Utah and had offered to bear the expense of her
move.

Jason is responsible for the distance between himself and

his children and the court so found.
Jason hasn't established Stephanie's ability to assist in
those parent time costs.

Taking into consideration the

distances, the financial condition of the parties, the
responsibility for the distance between the parties and the other
factors enumerated herein, Jason has not established by a
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preponderance of the evidence that there was any abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in ordering statutory
visitation or in establishing that the costs thereof should be
borne by Jason.
Ill
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT IMPUTED
JASON'S INCOME.
On this argument, Jason agrees that imputation of income is
appropriate in some circumstances and simply recounts all of the
circumstances that would show that he was not voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed.

The thrust of his argument is that

he was diligent because he did not quit workf but took a lower
paying job.

Jason argues that because of stress he does not have

the ability to generate the higher income, that his taking a
lesser paying job was reasonable, and thus income could not be
imputed.
Jason quotes the case of Hill

v. Hill,

869 P.2d 963 (Ut. Ct.

App. 1994), where a party quit a higher paying job in order to go
back to the university to get a degree and it was determined that
imputation of income at the higher level was appropriate.

Jason

states that his situation is different from that case because he
did not decide to quit to go back to school nor did he, as in
Hill,

concede that imputation of income was appropriate.
13

A case

that argues towards imputation of income does not seem to support
Jason's position; the act of quitting his higher paid job was
voluntary.
Under Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.5(7) income may be
imputed where it is found that a parent is voluntarily unemployed
or underemployed.

The court is to take into consideration

employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work
history, occupation qualifications and earnings for persons in
similar backgrounds in the community.

Let's explore, for a

moment the facts the court had which relate to this issue.

The

court had some detail with regard to historical earnings of the
parties when they were married and moved to Oregon.

The court

had the base pay of a Walmart manager at $50,000.00, plus a
percentage of the profits [R.82 at 29]; in 2001 the parties made
$65,677.00 [R.82 at 36]; in 2002 the parties made $62,601.00
[R.82 at 36]; Jason's Answer and Counterclaim and his own
documentation represented his income to be $40,600.00 per year;
and his financial declaration stated his income to be $31,200.00
per year.
The court had several different income amounts for Jason,
established by different methods [R.82 at 36]. This information,
together with information as to the income of a manager in the
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Walmart system [R.82 at 93], gave the court sufficient
information to impute income.

Both of the parties believed

Jason would retain his manager's salary, or at least that of an
assistant manager, once they moved to Illinois [R.82 at 87, 95].
The main reason Jason was no longer working as a manager was that
he chose not to do so because of the "stress". [R.82 at 55]. Had
Jason continued to work as a manager and had not cut back on his
hours approximately one year after the parties separated, his
income would have remained at $50,000.00, plus a percentage of
profits.

Jason stated that the only thing that stopped him from

working as a manager was that "he wanted to make sure that his
life was in order first". [R.82 at 47]. Jason's testimony was
that he chose not to be an assistant manager in 2002 and decided
to take a pay cut from $41,500.00 down to unload trucks for
around $30,000.00. [R.82 at 176].
The court found that Jason had established that he did have
difficulties in trying to be a manager and may not be able to
return to that position, but there had not been a showing that he
had the same difficulty as an assistant manager.

The evidence

was uncontroverted that he could earn approximately $41,500.00 as
an assistant manager and could be successful in that position and

15

his income should be imputed at said amount.

Not being employed

as an assistant manager was a voluntary decision on Jason's part.
In the case of Mancil

v. Smith,

18 P.3d 509 (Ut. Ct. App.

2000), the court was looking at the imputation of income and the
issue was that sufficient findings had not been made regarding
the occupation qualifications, pjrevailing earnings for persons of
similar background in the community, etc., as set forth in
§78-45-7.5.

In Mancil,

U.C.A.

the argument was that the court had erred

in imputing income to the other party based solely on the past
work history.

The Utah Supreme Court held that these findings

were "necessarily implied" by the nature of the work she had
regularly performed in the past.

Mancil

at 120.

The court went

on to state:

"The court looked at Smith's prior work history and
noticed his wages at his past place of employment . . .
the court also looked at his employment history and
income prior to his employment at Enrich. The court
then imputed income . . . consistent with his long term
employment history. Explicit findings concerning
'occupational qualifications and prevailing earnings of
persons of similar backgrounds in the community' were
not necessary as Smith's qualifications and background
and actual past earnings were not in dispute.
See Id.
at pp.15-16. Therefore there was an adequate factual
basis supporting the trial court's decision to impute
income to Smith . . . "
The recitation of facts from the transcript involving stress
and Jason's assertion that he was not a malingerer does not
16

answer the question of whether income may be imputed.

Jason

stated he voluntarily gave up the job as assistant manager to
work as a "stocker".

When these facts are taken in the best

light of Stephanie's case, the court had sufficient facts on
which to determine that imputation of income was proper.

With no

additional showing by Jason that there was something improper
about the imputation, there is no abuse of discretion.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUFFICIENT FACTS UPON WHICH TO AWARD
ALIMONY.
Three factors have long been considered, and must always be
considered, before awarding alimony.

First, the financial

condition of the recipient spouse; second, the ability of the
recipient spouse to provide a sufficient income for herself; and
third, the ability of the payor spouse to provide support.
Davis
Jones,

v. Davis,

See

749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988), citing Jones

700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).

v.

The court clearly

recognized the responsibility to balance Stephanie's need against
Jason's ability to pay. [R.82 at 227]. In this regard, the court
reviewed two financial declarations, showing Stephanie's monthly
income and expenses with and without welfare and food stamps.
[R.82 at 43-45, 54]. The trial court had the information that
Stephanie was receiving $555 per month in welfare and $336 in
17

food stamps, her entire income was provided by public assistance.
[R82 at 43]. From her financial declarations, the court had the
information that Stephanie was going in the hole each month and
was being subsidized by her family. [R.82 at 54].
The court noted that Stephanie did not have the ability to
pay her attorney's fees and that she had no ability to pay credit
card debt. [R.82 at 37-42].

Much has been made by Jason that

Stephanie had the ability to go back to work for Walmart in the
Monticello area (the closest being 60 miles away) and that going
to school to become a nurse was foolhardy.

If Stephanie were to

return to Walmart she would do so at entry level wages and she
was paying $6.00 per hour for daycare, netting approximately
$1.00 per hour for her efforts.

Stephanie further stated that

when she came to the San Juan County area she was able to survive
by living with her parents and by accepting help from her family.
The best way for Stephanie to become gainfully employed and be
able to support herself and the three children, would be to
complete her nursing studies.
With the two financial statements, [R. 46, R.82 at 43-45;
Exhibits 1 and 2], the court clearly had sufficient evidence
within the record to establish Stephanie's financial need.
testimony with regard to her income and ability to work at
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The

Walmart (a distance of 60 miles one way) and the expense of day
care, gave the court substantial information upon which to make
the determination that Stephanie was unable to support herself
and the three children.
The imputation of Jason's income was previously discussed in
issue III and such information established Jason's ability to pay
alimony.
An alimony award should, insofar as possible, equalize the
parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a
level as close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed in
the marriage.

Given the small amount of income Stephanie is

realistically able to earn on her own, she will not be able to
enjoy a standard of living anywhere near the level she enjoyed
when the parties earned $65,000.

Her expenses exceeding her

income, she has been forced to rely upon public assistance and
help from her family, while Jason maintained, or bettered, his
standard of living with a new family.
The alimony award in the present case falls short of placing
Stephanie in a standard of living enjoyed during marriage, a most
important function of alimony.
Higley,

The court stated in Higley

76 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983):
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v.

"This court will not disturb the trial court's
distribution of property and award of alimony in a
divorce proceeding unless a clear and prejudicial abuse
of discretion is shown."

The court concluded that Stephanie had only $669.00 to meet
her needs and that Jason had $2550.00 to meet his needs [R.82 at
225], that neither of the parties was going to be able to enjoy
the lifestyle that they had while Jason was working as a manager
at Walmart in Oregon.

Therefore, the court endeavored to "spread

the misery" [R.82 at 226], and the court awarded alimony for only
three years.
None of the facts quoted in this portion of Appellee's brief
are controverted by Jason.

His brief merely wishes the Court of

Appeals to come to a different conclusion than the trial court.
Such desire is not enough to invoke a reversal.

Jason has not

controverted the facts or established that the trial court made
an erroneous ruling, other than Jason's feeling that the court
should have made a different ruling, more in his favor.
V
THE COURT IS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES.
The basis for awarding of attorney's fees is very similar to
the awarding of alimony.

There are three factors for the trial

court to consider in awarding attorney's fees.
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First, the

receiving spouse's financial need; second, the payor spouse's
ability to pay; and third, the reasonableness of the requested
fees.

Childs

v. Childs,

967 P.2d 942, 947 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998):

"The decision to award attorney's fees and the amount
thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the
trial court." Id. at 947.
Stephanie has previously argued the issues of her need and
Jason's ability to pay.

The only other issue is the

reasonableness of the attorney fees.

Stephanie's attorney

established that $125 per hour is a reasonable rate for attorneys
in the San Juan County area and the total amount of fees up to
the trial was $2000.

An additional $500 would be charged for a

QDRO and based upon such testimony, Jason's attorney elected to
prepare the final documents and the QDRO.

No opposing testimony

was presented by Ms. Reilly with regard to the reasonableness of
fees or the amount charged.

Aside from case law which

establishes that reasonable attorney fees may be awarded, Utah
Code Annotated, §30-3-3 provides:
"In any action to establish an order of custody, parent
time, child support, alimony or division of property,
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorneys
fees and witness fees of the other party to enable the
other party to prosecute or defend the action."
Additionally, at subpart (2):
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"In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent
time, child support, cilimony or the division of
property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
and attorney fees upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense."
The uncontroverted evidence in this case establishes that
Stephanie's attorneys fees and costs were reasonable and further,
that she did prevail on the issues, and thereby the court was
within its discretion to award attorneys fees and costs and took
into consideration the relative position of both parties and
reasonableness of those fees in awarding $2000.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant has chosen to attack the trial court's ruling
based in each case, on abuse of discretion.

In so doing, Jason

must marshal the evidence and show, in light of all of the
evidence which supports the findings of the court, that there was
no way the court could reach the decisions it reached.
Appellant has failed in each area contested.

The

Jason has failed to

marshal the evidence, has failed to establish the factors the
court could have considered to support its decision.
With regard to the attorneys fees, it is within the sound
discretion of the trial court to make such determination because
of the trial court's familiarity with the litigation, attorneys
and attorneys fees in general in the area where that court sits,
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without some showing of clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion, this court should not disturb the trial court's
rulings; the same can be said for the awarding of alimony.

The

court's award of alimony is not disturbed unless there is clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion.
Jason has failed to meet his burden on each claim.

The

court did not abuse its discretion in its determination of these
issues and the ruling of the trial court should not be
overturned.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

&

day of J u l y ,

V

CRAIG C.
Attorne

2004

,LS
Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellee, to be delivered via first
class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following on the 15th
day of July, 2004:
Rosalie Reilly
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
P. 0. Box 404
Monticello, Utah 84535

23

